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On the Pessimistic Induction and Two
Fallacies
Juha T. Saatsi†‡
The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument
against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due
to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction
(in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic
Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores
the propriety of the realist program of responding to PMI by undermining one or
another of its premises.
1. Introduction. Probably the best known argument against scientific re-
alism is the argument from Pessimistic Induction (Poincare´ 1952; Putnam
1978; Laudan 1981). This argument in some form or another has been
part and parcel of the realism debate for quite some time now. It is
therefore interesting to come across two recent papers which both claim
that the argument in its best known form is actually fallacious (Lange
2002; Lewis 2001). Here I want to re-establish the dignity of the Pessimistic
Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and
hence restore the propriety of the realist program of responding to this
argument by undermining one or another of its premises.
I take the Pessimistic (Meta-)Induction (PMI) against scientific realism
to be in essence the argument employed by Laudan (1981). Laudan ap-
peals to an historical record of successful yet false theories to argue against
the connection that realists like to draw between successfulness of a theory
and its approximate truth—the connection that a successful theory is
deemed probably approximately true. This connection is at the heart of
the realist’s No Miracles Argument (NMA), the intuition being that the
best explanation of the success of science is the approximate truth of its
†To contact the author, please write to: School of Philosophy, University of Leeds,
Woodhouse Lane, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK; e-mail: mat8jts@leeds.ac.uk.
‡I want to thank Angelo Cei, Steven French, and Scott Shalkowski for helpful com-
ments, and Philip Good for sparking the initial interest to the topic.
THE PESSIMISTIC INDUCTION 1089
theories. PMI was devised—in the hands of Laudan, at least—to deliver
a lethal blow to NMA. Hence the exact content of PMI is connected in
a subtle way to our understanding of NMA, and the latter must be kept
firmly in mind in considering the validity of the former.
Laudan’s version of PMI can be succinctly reconstructed as the fol-
lowing reductio (Lewis 2001, 373; Psillos 1996), which we may call [PMI]:
(1) Assume that success of a theory is a reliable test for its truth.
(2) So most current successful scientific theories are true.
(3) Then most past scientific theories are false, since they differ from
current successful theories in significant ways.
(4) Many of these past theories were also successful.
(5) So successfulness of a theory is not a reliable test for its truth (since
this leads to contradiction in (3) and (4))
A typical realist response to this reductio can take issue with, for example,
the implicit premise of step (3) by describing (usually via careful case
studies) some theoretical elements solely responsible for the successfulness
of past theories in a way that renders these theories continuous with
otherwise incompatible current theories, and hence candidates of ap-
proximate truth in some suitable, restricted sense. (e.g., Psillos 1999) I am
personally very optimistic about such a line of response, but the purpose
of this paper is not to question the premises of Laudan’s argument. Here
my sole purpose is to stand up for the dignity of such premise defeating
work against two lines of thought that claim to remove the antirealist
threat of PMI by denying the validity of the argument to begin with.
2. Lange’s Turnover Fallacy. Lange (2002) presents the turnover fallacy
as a potential source of invalidity of pessimistic inductions in general (and
not just of PMI against the realist). The basic idea of this fallacy can be
conveyed by the following example:
Assume there is a board of directors comprising of ten members and
that you are introduced as a new member to this board replacing someone
else. You are told that the company is in turmoil: there has been a change
in the assemblage of the board 240 times in the past ten years, but you
don’t know who’s been sitting in the board for how long. You pessimis-
tically infer, inductively, that someone is going to be replaced again very
soon. It could be you or it could be someone else for all you know.
You might be tempted to pessimistically infer that the probability of
most of you getting the boot within a year, say, is quite high. But this
would be to commit the turnover fallacy! For it could be that nine out
of ten members of the board have actually sat in throughout the past ten
years and it is only your ‘predecessors’, as it were, who came and went.
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Just by knowing the number of personnel changes in the board does not
allow you to inductively infer anything about the probability for any one
particular individual to get replaced—all you can infer is the high prob-
ability for someone to get replaced.
Now consider the case of scientific PMI. Looking at the set of current,
well confirmed, successful theories we may want to ask: “How likely is
it that most of these theories will turn out to be false and will be replaced
by new theories incompatible with them?” Given a very bad numerical
historical record of successful yet false theories we may be tempted—
vaguely remembering the intuition behind the PMI argument—to answer
“Very likely.” But this would be to commit the turnover fallacy! For it
could be that most of the current theories have been stable throughout
the historical record tracking period, and all the numerous theory changes
involve the ‘predecessors’, as it were, of only one current theory.
Although this is a point about a type of induction in general, Lange
takes it to be telling against Laudan’s argument in particular. The alleged
lesson is that to validly infer the wanted conclusion—that most current
theories are probably false—one needs to use a premise much stronger
than (3) above in an argument of slightly different form.
. . . a pessimistic induction of a somewhat different and less familiar
form is made impervious to the turnover fallacy by employing a
historical premise that is not cumulative: at most past moments, most
of the theories receiving wide acceptance at that moment are false
(by current lights). (Lange 2002, 284)
This is significant since the usual premise “that most of the theories that
have ever been accepted were false is inevitably more plausible than the
needed premise: that at most past moments, most of the theories then
accepted were false” (2002, 285). A fallacy is committed, Lange proposes,
since a typical statement of PMI (such as Laudan’s) only refers to the
number of past false theories as an inductive basis, and yet draws a con-
clusion about the high likelihood of any one of our present theories to
be found false and replaced in the course of future science.
It must be admitted that Lange makes a fine point about pessimistic
inductions in general, but nevertheless it seems that this potential fallacy
cannot be incorporated against the scientific PMI of interest (that is, Lau-
dan’s PMI). Here we need to be more careful about the real objective of
the PMI argument—what is the conclusion being inferred exactly? To
begin with, note that the conclusion (5) above makes no reference to
future times: what will be found false or whether any theory shifts will
take place. This argument [PMI] is therefore not an argument to the time-
dependent conclusion that most of our current theories will be most likely
found false and will be replaced. Rather, it is an argument to the timeless
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conclusion that “successfulness of a theory is not a reliable test for its
truth.” As a matter of fact, in this conclusion no reference is made even
to the probable falsity of any one theory of the current successful science;
this conclusion would indeed hold even if the current theories were all
likely to be true! And nonetheless the force of the argument is considerable
given the key role of the claimed explanatory connection between success
and approximate truth in the realist’s game plan. It is interesting to notice
that in the literature the term ‘Pessimistic Induction’, originally coined
by Putnam in 1978, is invariably tagged on to the antirealist line of thought
the canonical formulation of which is taken as [PMI] (i.e., Laudan’s re-
ductio argument as presented above). The failure to properly distinguish
Laudan’s argument from Putnam’s rhetoric is behind Lange’s undue op-
timism to be able to sidestep the antirealist worry about the historical
facts of science as they are typically told.
This reading of PMI—viz. merely as something to counter NMA—
may feel unintuitively neutral to some.1 One may feel that PMI should
have some pessimistic force on its own and not just as a reactive opposition
to NMA, and we can indeed discern different levels of pessimism which
PMI is sometimes taken to be an argument for. For example, witness
Psillos’ informal summary of Laudan’s argument:
Therefore, by a simple (meta-)induction on scientific theories, our
current successful theories are likely to be false (or, at any rate, are
more likely to be false than true), and many or most of the theoretical
terms featuring in them will turn out to be nonreferential. (1999, 101)
This sentence perhaps typifies a more customary reading of PMI as en-
tailing the probable falsity of any one of our current theories, and indeed
this is the reading that Lange explicitly adopts. Is this reading of the
argument, referring to the probable falsity of our current theories, now
subject to the turnover fallacy as Lange suggests?
I believe not.2 First of all, we need to notice that this new argument is
1. Laudan (1981) does not use the term PMI, but I believe this ‘weak’ reading of PMI
is closest to the use Laudan makes of his pessimistic historical record. This version of
the anti-realist’s argument is obviously already damaging against the realist, given the
respective objectives of the two positions: even if the PMI does not conclude that most
current successful theories are probably false, the anti-realist has shown (by under-
mining NMA) that there is no rationale for taking these theories to be true either, and
agnosticism follows. The anti-realist, of course, can be quite happy with this (cf. van
Fraassen 1980).
2. This is not to say, of course, that there are no other weaknesses or fallacies that
the proposed simplistic classical statistical reasoning may succumb to.
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no longer just the reductio presented above.3 Rather, we now add to the
above reductio a statistical argument along the following lines, call it
[PMI*]:
(1*) Of all the successful theories, current and past, most are taken to
be false by the current lights.
(2*) The current theories are essentially no different from the past suc-
cessful theories with respect to their “observable” properties. (Viz.
properties potentially figuring in the realist’s explanatory argument.)
(3*) Success of a current theory is not a reliable indicator of its truth
(by the reductio argument above), and there is no other reliable
indicator of truth for the current theories.
(4*) Therefore any current successful theory is probably false by statis-
tical reasoning.
This argument concludes that any one current successful theory, ceteris
paribus, is probably false for all we know. The ceteris paribus clause
effectively amounts to the premises (2*) and (3*) above: NMA is taken
to be indiscriminating so that the current observer is taken to have no
advantage over the past observers in evaluating the truthlikeness of a
successful theory. Furthermore, this clause should be also taken to rule
out all kinds of ‘relativisations’ of NMA to specific scientific domains:
scientific methodologies and mechanisms are taken to be homogeneous
across the domains and the competing realist and antirealist arguments
apply across the board. I take the content of these premises to be implicit
in the standard construal of PMI.
The argument [PMI*] does not fall foul of the turnover fallacy. However,
one may be tempted to further infer from such probable falsity the high
probability of finding a theory false and it getting replaced, but such an
inference would go beyond the confines of—and indeed beyond the va-
lidity of—this version of pessimistic induction. Hence a timeless conclu-
sion (4*) is inferred from timeless premises and no fallacy of turnover is
being committed; this fallacy requires a reference to a time dependent
property (e.g., getting the boot within the next two weeks) in the conclu-
sion but ‘being false’ is not such property.4 And a further argument to
the conclusion that false theories will be replaced in the course of future
3. The argument is usually presented as a reductio as I have presented it (cf. Laudan
1981; Lewis 2001; Psillos 1999). Lange also refers to Laudan and Psillos in his discussion
of the scientific pessimistic induction.
4. Notice that there is a time-dependent part in the above quote from Psillos (1999)
invalidly going beyond the confines of PMI. Curiously enough there is no such explicit
mistake to be found in Lange’s exposition of PMI.
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science, whilst perhaps not unthinkable, is surely not part and parcel of
the contemporary NMA vs. PMI debate.
Moreover, the conclusion of [PMI*] is clearly compatible with the kind
of possible (asymmetric) state of affairs that Lange puts forward as prob-
lematic. Assume that all theory changes have taken place within just one
domain of scientific enquiry, say. It seems, pace Lange, that we nonetheless
have reason, ceteris paribus, to believe that all domains of enquiry are
currently ridden with false theories. This is because the only feature of
theories appealed to in NMA is their successfulness and not, say, the
duration of their reign. Once the connection between success and truth
has been demolished by [PMI], all the current successful theories (in-
cluding those which we inductively have no reason to expect to get re-
placed) are on a par with all the past successful theories in one big domain
of theories most of which are false, and the conclusion (4*) can be drawn.
Furthermore, whilst the assumed asymmetric state of affairs undoubtedly
begs for some explanation, it is not clear that we have any reason to think
that the best explanation is achieved by hypothesising the stable theories
to be true. What the realist needs is an argument to the conclusion that
the combination of successfulness and long lifespan of a theory is best
explained via truthlikeness, or something like that. As far as I know, no
such version of NMA has yet been developed. On the other hand, our
degree of confidence to realism as a possible explanation of the asymmetric
state of affairs is significantly lowered by Laudan’s PMI and the avail-
ability of numerous other explanations, together with the ceteris paribus
clause.
One may, of course, have grave doubts about the ceteris paribus clause
in the above portrayal of [PMI*], and many realists indeed argue that at
least some current successful theories are not on a par with the past
theories which are employed as the basis of the statistical inference above.
But while this may offer a way to encounter this version of PMI, it does
so by undermining one significant premise of the argument and not by
virtue of showing it to harbour the turnover fallacy.
I prefer to follow Laudan and read the argument as the reductio [PMI].
We should notice that Laudan’s argument is a somewhat atypical case of
induction. Usually induction is described as an inference from the par-
ticular to the general, and it typically concerns states of affairs at future
times being inferred from states of affairs at past times. But we have seen
that [PMI] is not best characterised in such terms. Rather, [PMI] should
be viewed as a reductio of an indiscriminating realist image—a challenge
to the realist’s beloved connection between success and truth. Even if none
of our current theories eventually succumbed to some incompatible suc-
cessors, the antirealist could nonetheless appeal to [PMI] as an anti-NMA.
To do this, all that is required is a pool of theories all of which are
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successful at some time or another, yet most of which have turned out to
be false.
So perhaps it is better to regard this meta-induction as a statistical
argument against the realist claim that one ‘observable’ feature of our
theories—successfulness—is a reliable statistical indicator of another,
‘unobservable’ feature of our theories: their truth(likeness). This is exactly
what Peter Lewis (2001) does and claims that it falls victim to another
kind of fallacy.
3. Lewis’s False Positives Fallacy. Lewis presents an altogether different
rationale for regarding PMI thus understood as harbouring a fallacy. For
Lewis the problem is that “the premise that many false past theories were
successful does not warrant the assertion that success is not a reliable test
for truth” (2001, 374). More specifically: the fallacy of false positives that
Lewis has in mind concerns the reliability of successfulness as an indicator
of (approximate) truth. The notion of statistical reliability is usually char-
acterised in statistics literature in terms of the rates of false positives and
false negatives: a reliable indicator is one for which “the false positive
rate and false negative rate are both sufficiently small, where what counts
as sufficiently small is determined by the context” (2001, 374–375). An
instance of false positive (negative) indication is, of course, one in which
the existence (absence) of an indication fails to reflect the existence (ab-
sence) of the indicated. The rate of false positives (negatives) is then
calculated as the number of such cases per all negative (positive) cases.
With statistical reliability characterised in these terms Lewis then takes
successfulness to be a reliable indicator of the (approximate) truth of a
theory T (picked at random out of all theories at time t) if and only if
the rate of false-yet-successful theories is small and the rate of true-but-
unsuccessful theories is small. With this notion of statistical reliability at
hand Lewis explains why Laudan’s reductio formulation of PMI is a non
sequitur:
At a given time in the past, it may well be that false theories vastly
outnumber true theories. In that case, even if only a small proportion
of false theories are successful, and even if a large proportion of true
theories are successful, the successful false theories may outnumber
successful true theories. So the fact that successful false theories out-
number successful true theories at some time does nothing to un-
dermine the reliability of success as a test for truth at that time, let
alone other times. In other words, the realist can interpret Laudan’s
historical cases, not as evidence against the reliability of success as
a test for truth, but merely as evidence of the scarcity of true theories
in the past. (2001, 377)
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Figure 1. Domains compatible with both statistical reliability and ‘bad’ historical rec-
ord. The ratio of successful (grey) and unsuccessful (white) is constant for each domain
over time.
And to do otherwise is, Lewis proposes, to commit the fallacy of false
positives.
The basic intuition behind this argument is made most clear in pictorial
terms in Figure 1. We can see immediately that by having a big enough
domain of false and unsuccessful theories we can satisfy the requirement
of statistical reliability even in cases in which, somewhat unintuitively
perhaps, the probability of a randomly drawn successful theory to be true
is small (less than 0.5, say). At both times pictured the requirement of
statistical reliability is satisfied. Furthermore, given that we take most of
our current theories to be successful, it follows “deductively that most
current theories are true, as required by the realist” (2001, 375). This
Lewis takes to be a reasonable justification for regarding statistical reli-
ability to be a notion that adequately captures the realist’s appeal to the
success-versus-truth connection.
So the notion of statistical reliability works for Lewis on the assumption
that the statistical reference classes (relative to which statistical reliability
is determined) are of the right kind and vary radically as we move from
past to current theories: the domain of all theories at some past time tp
must contain a much higher proportion of false and unsuccessful theories
than the domain of all current theories. This immediately raises a couple
of worries regarding the overall framework in which Lewis casts his re-
alism and allegedly sidesteps the challenge of PMI: (1) How are the crucial
reference classes defined in the first place? (2) Has there really been a
change in the reference classes such as to enable Lewis’s response to PMI
to get off the ground?
(1) First of all, it is not at all clear that the notion of reference class
of statistical reliability is well-defined in the context of scientific theories.
It seems that the relevant domains of all true theories and all false theories
(at some time t) with respect to which the rates of false negatives and
false positives are calculated are not straightforwardly definable in the
way a pool of people, say, is readily given in a typical case of medical
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statistics, for example. Not much has been said in the discussion so far
about the putative identity conditions of theories—it just has been sur-
mised that they could in principle be given. But whereas this assumption
may be reasonable with respect to both the set of successful theories and
the set of true theories, I can make no sense of the idea of delineating a
non-arbitrary, well-defined collection of both false and unsuccessful
theories.
Lewis’s realism-friendly scenario which makes Laudan’s historical rec-
ord compatible with success being a reliable statistical indicator depends
on there having been a large domain of such false and unsuccessful theories
relative to which the rate of false positives is small.5 But what exactly are
the theories which are neither successful nor true? Should we count in
only the theory-proposals made by eminent scientists, or perhaps all the
proposals actually published in scientific journals, or what? It is easy to
imagine a variety of sociological factors, say, yielding scores of unsuc-
cessful and false theories, directly affecting the notion of reliability at
stake. But why should we care about those theories? It just seems that
the debate between NMA and PMI does not involve unsuccessful and
false theories (or true yet unsuccessful, for that matter) in anything like
the way Lewis projects.
But perhaps a case could be made that the realist should really give us
some rough idea of how many false and unsuccessful theories there are
per each successful one, given that NMA—being a form of inference to
the best explanation—seems to hang on the assumption that this ratio is
not high enough to explain away the ‘miracle’ of successful science by
the mere number of trials. But however we decided to delineate the domain
of all theories it should not be the case that the realist explanation is held
hostage to contingent matters regarding the number of false and unsuc-
cessful theories in the strict manner implied by Lewis’s strategy; realism
simply cannot depend on the alleged (contingent) fact that most current
theories are successful! Rather, it is implicit in the No-Miracles intuition
that any feasible fluctuation in the number of false and unsuccessful the-
ories—feasible to science as we know it—is not large enough to overthrow
NMA as the best explanation around.6
5. Lewis’s proposal for testing the history of science for the pessimistic conclusion of
PMI in a valid way consists of taking “a random sample of theories which are known
to be false, and show[ing] that a significant proportion of them are nevertheless suc-
cessful” (2001, 378). The worry now is that this testing cannot be done since the domain
in question is ill-defined.
6. Whether or not this intuition holds is another matter, of course. The point is that
Lewis has not only provided a response to PMI but also a particular understanding
of realism to go with it. The problems with the former really spring from the inadequacy
of the latter.
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(2) So has there been a change in the reference class of the kind that
Lewisian realism requires? The idea is that realism only requires that most
of our current theories are true which deductively follows, given good
statistical reliability of success as an indicator of truth, from the premise
that most of our current theories are successful. That is, given any one
successful theory—current or past—the best explanation for a Lewisian
realist of its successfulness is that either it is (approximately) true or it is
a member of a huge domain of false theories a small portion of which
are successful. Regarding past successful science, at least, this is fully
amenable to an antirealist reading. To an antirealist like Bas van
Fraassen—who persistently denies the force of the No-Miracles Argu-
ment—an explanation such as the above is good enough and fully con-
sonant with his Darwinian selectionist image of science. For van Fraassen,
of course, this picture fits the bill with respect to current science just as
well; that is, he denies the initial premise of Lewis’s that most of our
current theories are successful. But the soundness of that premise is neither
necessary nor sufficient for the realist to make a case against van Fraassen;
what is required is NMA as typically understood and the intuition that
(approximate) truth is thus connected to successfulness—and for that
intuition to have bite is for it to have bite at all times, regardless of the
number of false and unsuccessful theories present at the time in question.7
As a matter of fact, Lewis’s unorthodox formulation of the realist
position seems to beg the question against this point to begin with. Ac-
cording to Lewis “convergent realism usually includes the thesis that most
of our current theories are true” (2001, 371). But this is certainly an
unreasonably strong thesis for any realist to aspire after: contingent mat-
ters regarding the number of false and unsuccessful theories produced by
the scientific community depends on factors quite independent from re-
alism and NMA—or so the realist argues—which is why convergence is
typically characterised in terms of increasing level of ‘truthlikeness’ in a
sequence of successful theories of cumulative empirical adequacy. Lewis’s
convergent realist is committed “to the empirical claim that successful
theories were rare in the past and are common today” (2001, 377). Such
commitment is not generally acknowledged to be part of any contem-
porary realist position. And it better not be! Keeping in mind how strict
a qualification ‘successful’ can be for the realist and casually glancing
7. Unless, of course, that ‘number’ is so high as to undermine the credibility of NMA
as the best explanation altogether as explained in (1) above. Lewis stresses “the inference
that the realist wishes to draw from the success of most current theories to their truth”
(2001, 378, my italics) but this requires that the realist accounts for some principled
difference between the current and the past. And Lewis does not provide such an
account.
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through the Journal of Mathematical Physics, for example, one is bound
to be convinced of the sheer incredibility of this premise upon which
realism a` la Lewis is erected.
4. Conclusion. Despite Lange’s and Lewis’s respective attempts to short
circuit the Pessimistic Meta-Induction it remains a powerful force to be
reckoned with. There is no easy way out for the realist; one or another
of the premises must be defeated. To get properly started with this task
the realist ought to recognise the variety of forms this intuitively straight-
forward argument can take when looked at in closer detail. This paper
has focused only on how PMI should not be understood and much work
remains to be done to understand the subtle interplay between PMI and
NMA vis-a`-vis the notion of success as an indicator of (approximate)
truth. To achieve an adequate account of this notion we need to appreciate
the timeless character of PMI as a reductio of NMA and not construe
the latter in terms of mere statistical reliability.8
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